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"In manipulating these kinds of connections (similarity and contiguity) in
both their aspects (positional and semantic)-selecting, combining, and
ranking them- an individual exhibits his personal sty le, his verbal
pred ilections and preferences."
Roman Jakobson, Two Aspects of Language
" Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a
division of material and mental labour appears. From this moment
onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other
than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something
without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a
position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the
formation of 'pure'theory ... "
Karl Marx, The German Ideology

Competence
The competence and performance distinction has a complex history in linguistic
theory. With this short essay, I would like to step into the flow of that complex history
by posing the question of difference, which asks what difference difference makes to
linguistic theory. My argument will be that the difference difference makes can be
registered through the design feature of language liguistic theory dubs reflexivity. For
linguistic theory, reflexivity is not just one design feature among the others inasmuch as
it is reflexivity itself that motivates the question of difference. As any standard linguistic
textbook will make c lear, reflexivity is that design feature of language that reflects, "The
c1bility to use the communication system to discuss the system the system itself'

(linguistics 200 1). Together, difference and reflexivity collapse the subject of linguistic

analysis into what I will here call a singularity. I call it a singularity because it contains
all at once and by no mere contingency the subject of linguistic analysis, the object of
lingui stic analysis, and the medium in which the former studies the latter. Indeed, one
might say that the phrase 'the subject of linguistic analysis' denotes the singularity as a
three-way ambiguity. The question of difference thus puts into quest ion the different
thematic roles the subject of linguistic analysis occupies in the formulation of its
scientific project to write explanatory grammars. Owing to the reflex ive design feature of
language and the question of difference, the subject of linguistic analysis is such stuff as
the singularity is made of. The singularity thus contains all the elements that give rise to
the scientific activity of writing explanatory grammars and contains itself to boot.
In the light of the singularity, competence and performance are not so much
opposites as already effects of the singularity. We might number the effects of the
singularity thus: (i) any view or perspective on competence will automatically be
indebted to performance, (ii) performance expresses competence, performative errors and
all , and (iii) every formal computation over the variables of universal grammar is also a
l'unctional one . In effect, the singularity converts all uses of language into formal as well
as functional processes, including the writing of explanatory grammars. Within the
enclosure of the singularity, no linguist can declare the thesis of the autonomy of syntax
except as a performative contradiction since the declaration of autonomy is dependent on
the system to which it attributes autonomy. This self-reflexive function operating over
the moment of utterance or textual production in general by no means spells the end of
the autonomy of syntax nor does it favor functional linguistic analyses. Instead, as a
scientific disposition, it does imply that every view of competence w ill have to be
screened through the singularity of the subject oflinguistic analysis. The epigraph from
Roman Jakobson is instructive here and indeed it is what motivates my specific
hypothesis, which is simply that style mediates between competence and performance.
Only a theoretical and methodological fiat can keep Jakobson's view of style from having
scope over the linguist's scene of writing, the place where the grammar is produced or
wri tten, there where the linguist decides on data, hypotheses, and what counts as
ex planatory theory. Under the force of the singularity, Jakobson's view of style is
eq ual ly at work in the object-language as in the meta-language.
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The practice of theory construction in linguistics, as Chomsky put it a while back,
proceeds along an ambiguous pathway, works off a systematic analogy between
acqui ring a language and the practice of writing explanatory grammars. As such the
material practice of writing an explanatory grammar, Chomsky proposed, should provide
a mode l of language acquisition by children. The two in a sense being parallel processes,
the linguist's model should adequately specify all the positive and negative outputs of the
grammar children learn without fail when exposed to their linguistic environment. In
typica l parlance, a generative grammar should generate all the grammatical strings of a
language and none of the ungrammatical ones and explain their plus or minus
grammatical status. Explicitness is the criterion the grammar chooses in order to meet
thi s responsibility. Explicitness being linked to simplicity, simplici ty to generality, and
generality to the strength of a theory's explanatory power, this criterion promises a view
of competence that lays bare its context-free principles, the autonomy of syntax. In
accord with the analogy, what the linguist attains as universal grammar through the
process of writing an explanatory grammar also explains or reflects why children learn
language so quickly and easily. One can say that children accomplish the great feat of
acquiring a language because they need put very little or no intention into the process, the
computation for language being a free algorithm, particularly with respect to the core
grammar. Explicitness is thus an expression of arbitrariness, the autonomy of syntax.
However, I invoke this analogy for both its fit and misfit. On the one hand, as the
work of linguists such as William Croft (1995) and Frederick Newmeyer ( 1998) clarifies,
few linguists reject the autonomy of syntax when it is articulated as an expression of
arbitrariness. On the other hand, the theoretical wisdom of this analogy puts competence
and performance on incommensurable scales, makes them differences of kind not degree.
The scales of grammaticality and acceptability balance on this incommensurable
difference of kind, the one relegated to the domain of competence and the other to the
domain of performance . This incommensurable difference, which receives a clear
articulation in the idealization of linguistic data to an ideal speaker-hearer in a
homogeneous speech community, brings to the fore a global paradox for linguistic theory
(Chomsky 1965 3-4). As object of study, the subject of linguistic analysis possesses a
knowledge that it cannot access. This subject-as-object-of-study has intuitions about
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what constitutes a well-formed string but these intuitions, if they sight in on competence,
are made opaque by extragrammatical factors, in word, discourse. Non-well-formed
strings often appear grammatical, as a mirage appears to be water, and well-formed
strings often appear unacceptable to certain subjects of linguistic analysis. A ttempts to
establi sh uni versal grammar as a discrete entity of knowledge are on-going, among these
are those of Carson T. Schutze, who has done linguistic theory a great favor by culling
together the contributions of the diverse disciplines speaking to this paradox inhabiting
language theory ( 1996). Schi.itze foll ows the division of the analogy when he states:
··Whether a sentence is grammatical is a question about competence ... Whether a
sentence is acceptable is a question about performance." (20) . However, the neat

cl ivision of the analogy, Schi.itze points out, has been difficult to keep intact:
T his apparently simple distinction is often muddied by the fact that the word
pe,formance has been used in different way at different times, by Chomsky and
others. It is sometimes used to refer to specific instances of behavior, or patterns
in general, as opposed to static knowledge that guides behavior. In other contexts
it is used to refer to anything outside of the granunar, incl uding static knowledge
of things li ke discourse structure or mechanisms for using language. (20).

Is this inconsistent usage of the word pe,formance no more than an accidental
consequence of the systematic ambiguity constituting the analogy, or is it the
consequence of a deeper theoretical problem with the dichotomy in the first place? If the
inconsistency is nothing more than an accident, then there is hope that someday a pure
view o r competence wi ll someday rectify the inconsistent usage. In terestingly, the
proposal Schi.itze offers to clarify the study of competence ends with a speculative
metaphor that references the properties of writing, in both a narrow and a generalized
sense. Th is is interesting because for some time now the philosophical efforts of
deconstruction, understood as a rigorous delimitation of Western metaphysics and
epistemology, have been going towards an acknowledgement of the debt owed to the
concept and phenomenon of writing.
1n

the light of a pure view of competence yet to come, the singularity registers the

inconsistent usage as a performance, a value stenuning from the paradox inhabiting
linguistic theory. Precisely at the point where the subject of linguistic analysis pulls
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away from performance factors with the scientific hope of providing a c lear view of
competence, the singularity calls that effort of abstraction a performance, subject to the
strength of hermeneutic forces. Herein, the degree of idealization, whether high or low,
makes a huge difference to language theory, whether formal or functional. The difficulty
that formal theory meets with in circumscribing universal grammar as a discrete and
inclependent form of knowledge is matched by the difficulty that functi onal theory
encounters when seeking to establish the category of subject in a cross-li nguistic way.
1ndeed,

the category subject as I just used it is radically insufficient to describe a

language such as Dyirbal. Both formal and functional linguists are ri ghtly worried about
le tting the grammar take decisions over the grammatical status of some string in the case
of the fo rmer or the universal status of some category in the case of the latter. Croft fo r
instance c learly expresses this worry: " At what point do we say that the category
'subject' does not exist [in Dyirbal] , as opposed to saying that it ex ists but that it is very
d ifferent from the English category?" (1 3). Croft's question might be taken not just as a
descriptive problem in linguistic theory as a whole, but equally as an effect of the
singularity. You will forgive me ifl now say that in both formal and functional
paradigms, the subj ect of linguistic analysis must view the subj ect of linguistic analysis
through the subject of linguistic analysis.
Nevertheless, the fact that performance bedevils access to competence does not in
the fi rst instance invalidate the idealization, disparage formal linguistic analysis, nor for
that matter favor functional analyses. It is clear that both formal and functional
paradigms enlist the aid of idealization in some form or another and that ne ither paradigm
disavows some fo rm of autonomy, except for the extreme forms of functionalism that
Croft identifies . Nonetheless, while the invariant success of childre n to acquire their
nat ive language speaks of the autonomy of syntax, the absence of li nguisti c theories that
provide explanations of pure competence speaks to the effects of the singul arity. If a
theory of pure competence is yet to come, might taking account of the singularity help it
along? And if yes, how?
Performance
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To address these questions requires a redoubling of the question of difference,
another turn on its relevance to linguistic theory. This turn does not lead out of the
enclosure, but in a sort of mobius strip function doubles the topological surface. The
not ion of difference at work in this redoubling takes us beyond the criteria of descriptive
and exp lanatory adequacy and in fact transgresses the correspondence theory of truth that
guides Iinguistic theory. It is this difference thus redoubled that for some time now has
been so liciting the disciplinary discourses of ethnography, literature, phil osophy, and
histor~' . etc., in the American academy. To locate the origin of thi s d ifference with the
fo unding structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure is no doubt a hyperbo le, but it is
convenient. Saussure begins to name this difference when he states that, "in language
there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive
terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences
without positive terms" (118). T his well-known passage admits of no pure identities in
language. And since for Saussure the linguist's proper object of study is langue, i.e.,
language minus speaking, it admits specifically of no pure identity for linguistic
competence. Without denying arbitrariness or the autonomy of langue, Saussure here
also draws an enclosure for language, with language, and in language. Language is an
advantage fo r human beings not in the first instance because it insures mappings of the
world that satisfy truth conditions but simply because it inaugurates the mapping and
guarantees as a property of language Chomsky now calls discrete in finity. Elsewhere in
the Cours Saussure pinpoints this advantage:

The characteristic role of language in relation to thought is not to supply the
material phonetic means by which ideas may be expressed. lt is to act as
intermediary between thought and sound, in such a way that the combination of
both necessarily produces a mutually complementary delimitation of units.
T hought, chaotic by nature, is made precise by this process of segmentation ( 110).

For a minimalist definition of competence one need look no further than to this
Saussurean articulation of the mediating function of language. Chomsky's rewriting of
/angue as competence retains difference as an element of langue when he states that
·' Linguistic expressions may be ' deviant' along all sorts of incommensurable dimensions,
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and we have " no notion of 'well-formed' sentence' "(1995, 194). Such a statement
acknowledges that linguists are adrift in a sea of differences without the benefit of a
horizon. Despite the absence of such a horizon, formal and functiona l language theory
has made advances in the understanding of language form and functi on. Why this should
be the case might be attributed to the Saussurean view of language as multiple mediations
o r differences w herein the satisfaction of truth-conditions is not necessary. This is the
sort of paradox that deconstruction has been calling the freeplay of difference and which l
am here re-dubbing the singularity. If there is a truth-functional acco unt of language, it is
that it is useful. Under this account, the instantiation of concepts into sound-images via
the med iation of lang uage-this competence- takes place as a matter of functional
utility, as Derek Bickerton puts it ( 1990). Language does just what it knows, even if it
cloesn ' t always know w hat it does, or precisely how. From the standpoint of this truism,
competence is just performance, an equation that by dint of the singularity includes the
material practice of writing explanatory grammars. Thus Chomsky proceeds in the face

or the singularity when he states that, " While there is no clear sense of to the idea that
language is ' desig ned fo r use' or ' well-adapted to its functions,' we do expect to find
connectio ns between the properties of the language and the maimer of its use" ( 1995,
168). Furthermore, computing the effects of the singularity into this statement implies

that even formal principles of grammatical theory have functional utili ty.
On first sight, it is difficult to see what possible functional utility a formal
principle of grammar such as the Empty Category Principle can have. T hi s principle in
parti cul ar, as Newmeyer states, "does not lend itself to easy translation into a semantic or
discourse-based vocabulary" (53). Within the enclosure of the singularity however, the
ECP has shown itself to have great functional utility not just as a theory-internal
ex planato ry device, but equally as important as a theoretical performance of the arbitrary
mapping between signified and signifier that language promotes. Here, the difference
between the form and function of the linguistic sign is doubled by dint of the fact that a
well-motivated principle of grammar demonstrates arbitrariness. The mo tivation this
forma l principle of grammar receives at the level of theory-construction mirrors the
mo tivatio n the ling uistic sign receives throughout all our exchanges of paroles by dint of
the social nature of langue. At the moment that formal language theory demonstrates
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arbitrariness with a well-motivated principle such as the ECP, it reproduces in the metalanguage, the theory, what already takes place in the object-language, the data. From the
standpoint of the singularity, the data that follow from the formulation of the ECP count
as stylistic choices- a complex index of the subjectivity of the subj ect of linguistic
analysis. Inasmuch as the data of the ECP favor formal analysis, they cannot also count
as neutral facts about competence. If the ECP is a fact about linguistic competence, it is a
fact compromised by the personal disposition of the linguist to select, combine, and
explain data in a certain way , what the singularity would call the performance of the
sub_j ect of linguistic analysis.
Perhaps the polemics between formal and functional linguistic camps are
symptomatic of the possibility that only compromised views of competence may be
available. After all, it is not as if the ECP presents itself as a clear and distinct Cartesian
idea in the same way as the Peano postulates. And from the functionalist perspective, it
is a preeminent fact that the category of subject is not subject to cross-l inguistic
validation (Croft 199 1). Discrete infinity has more in common with the notion of

successor number + I but their ontology as properties, the one of language and the other
of the number system, is hardly in dispute. For language theory, what is in dispute is how
to account for the property of discrete infinity, alias, linguistic com petence. If the Peano
postulates yield clear and distinct inferences to functional utility, why not a formal
account of linguistic competence?
Style
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English 150: The Study of Literature
Hewlett Cluster Course
CE 103
Prof. H. A. Torres
Office: Humanities 355, Phone: 277-6180
Office Hours: T & Th 3:30-4:30, W 4:30-5:30
e-mail: hector@unm.edu

Required Text

Making Litemture Matier, 2nd ed. Schilb, J. & Clifford, J.

Course Description and Procedures
The main objective of this course is to help you gain a deeper appreciation of the place
that literature has in culture and society. Beginning with the myth of Oedipus the King,
we will identify some major themes in English and American literature. Our objectives
,-viii be to gain a sense of this literary tradition through Shakespeare, Swift, Bradstreet,
Dicki nson, Hawthorne, Poe, Eliot, etc. Our readins will bring us into the postmoderns
such as Marquez, Rodriguez, Saldivar, Rivera, etc. Throughout the course, we will stay
fl ex ible, selecting the readings that express your interests. We will place a fair amount of
emphasis on the writing process. To do this we will work in small groups, reading each
other's writing, learning to evaluate it for effectivenss. Throughout the course you w ill
write short response papers, anywhere from 4 to 6. These papers will form the core of
your grade. To make these procedure work it is important that you be wil ling to let your
peers read your writing and evaluate it. In addition to these papers, you vvill also do oral
presentations. Your papers will amount to roughly two-thirds of your grade, and oral
presentations, along with attendance and interaction in class discussion, the final third.
Again, just to emphasize, much of our work will be done in small groups.

